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COMBAT RESTRAINTS 
Howard S. Levie 
Combat restraints fall into two sepa-
rate and distinct categories: (1) Re-
straints on the use of particular weap-
ons, such as the prohibitions on the use 
of dumdum bullets and poison gas; and 
(2) restraints on the actions that may be 
taken during the course of combat, such 
as the prohibitions on the denial of 
quarter and on the shooting of civilian 
noncombatants. The discussion which 
follows will be concerned solely with 
this latter type of restraints on permis-
sible combat actions. 
Most of these restraints, of both 
categories, have their origin in custom 
which has evolved over long periods of 
time. Many of these customs have been 
codified, primarily at The Hague in 
18991 and 19072 and at Geneva in 
19293 and 1949.4 However, they have 
not all been codified and, accordingly, 
there are still some rules for which we 
must have recourse to custom. At the 
first successful codification in 1899, in 
order to leave no doubt in this respect, 
it was agreed that the preamble of the 
convention being drafted should include 
a provision (which has become known 
as the deMartens Clause, after its au-
thor) to the effect that apart from the 
rules codified in the Regulations then 
being adopted, "populations and 
belligerents remain under the protection 
and empire of the principles of ihterna-
tional law, as they result from the 
usages established between civilized 
nations, from the laws of humanity, and 
the requirements of the public con-
science. ,,5 
There are, of course, a very large 
number of restraints on the actions that 
may be taken during the course of 
combat. The four specific areas of com-
bat restraints which will be discussed 
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are: (1) Military necessity; (2) reprisals; 
(3) protection of civilian noncombat-
ants; and (4) protection of prisoners of 
war. 
Military Necessity. Inasmuch as this 
doctrine is really an excuse for non-
compliance with combat restraints, its 
importance as an introduction to any 
discussion of such restraints is obvious. 
Over 100 years ago, in 1863, Francis 
Lieber defined this term as follows: 
"Military necessity, as understood by 
modern civilized nations, consists in the 
necessity of those measures which are 
indispensable for securing the ends of 
the war, and which are lawful according 
to the modern law and usages of iwar.,,6 
(Emphasis added.) Note that the last 
clause requires that all actions taken 
because of military necessity must be 
lawful actions. Contrary to the fore-
going, The German War Book, published 
early in this century, adopted the doc-
trine of "Kriegsraeson," which is, in 
effect, the doctrine that the end justifies 
the means: "Humanitarian claims such 
as the protection of men and their 
goods can only be taken into considera-
tion insofar as the nature of the war 
permits.,,7 That this was the Nazi policy 
during World War II is indicated by the 
following statement found in the 
opinion of the International Military 
Tribunal: 
There can be no doubt that the 
majority of [the war crimes com-
mitted during World War II by the 
Germans] arose from the Nazi 
conception of "total war," with 
which the aggressive wars were 
waged. For in this conception of 
"total war," the moral ideas 
underlying the conventions which 
seek to make war more humane 
are no longer regarded as having 
force or validity. Everything is 
made subordinate to the over-
mastering dictates of war. 8 
U.S. military doctrine has not 
changed during the period of more than 
a century since Lieber formulated it in 
1863. The present U.S. Army Manual 
states that military necessity "justifies 
those measures not forbidden by inter-
national law which are indispensable for 
securing the complete submission of the 
enemy as soon as possible.,,9 (Emphasis 
added.) It goes on to call attention to 
the fact that "military necessity has 
been generally rejected as a defense for 
acts forbidden by the customary and 
conventional laws of war inasmuch as 
the latter have been developed and 
framed with consideration for the con-
cept of military necessity." The British 
Army Manual is substantially to the 
same effect. 1 0 
The subject of military necessity as a 
defense for illegal combat actions was 
considered in a number of war crimes 
cases after World War II. Attention has 
already been invited to the statement of 
the International Military Tribunal. In 
the case of United States v. Krupp, the 
U.S. Military Tribunal said: 
In short, these rules and cus-
toms. of warfare are designed 
specifically for all phases of war. 
They comprise the law for such 
emergency. To claim that they 
can be wantonly-and at the sole 
discretion of anyone belligerent-
disregarded when he. considers his 
own situation to be critical means 
nothing more or less than to 
abrogate the laws and customs of 
war entirely. 11 
Similarly, in United States v. List, an-
other U.S. Military Tribunal held: 
Military necessity permits a bel-
ligerent, subject to the laws of 
war, to apply any amount and 
kind of force to compel the com; 
plete submission of the enemy 
with the least possible expendi-
ture of time, life and money .... 
The rules of international law 
must be followed even if it results 
in the loss of a battle or even a 
war. ,,12 (Emphasis added.) 
As a practical matter, there are still 
many who would agree with the impli-
cations of Bismarck's query: "What 
head of government would allow his 
state and its citizenry to be conquered 
by another state just because of interna-
tionallaw?,,13 While this may appear to 
put the problem at the civilian political 
level and to remove responsibility from 
the military commander, that is not 
always true. In any event, it must be 
borne in mind that when a chief of state 
decides that military necessity requires 
the violation of affirmative rules of the 
law of armed conflict he will not there-
after be held accountable alone: Those 
who pass down or execute his illegal 
orders in this respect may likewise be 
adjudged war criminals. 1 4 It might also 
be noted that, prior to the advent of the 
nuclear age (and, perhaps, even since 
that event), it was rare, indeed, that the 
illegal application of the rule of military 
necessity would make the difference 
between victory and defeat. 
Now let us attempt to apply the 
restrictions on the doctrine of military 
necessity to specific factual situations. 
The law of armed conflict specifi-
cally protects prisoners of war from 
maltreatment. For example, an armored 
unit has just captured a large number of 
prisoners of war. It receives urgent 
orders to move forward to participate in 
~ attack which is taking place some 
miles away. What does it do with its 
prisoners of war? It cannot take them 
along. It has no personnel available to 
guard them and no facilities for sending 
them to the rear. Does military neces-
sity permit the shooting of these POWs? 
No. The rule protecting them from 
maltreatment, including death, was 
drafted and adopted with full knowl-
edge of the existence of the doctrine of 
military necessity and overrides it in-
sofar as the treatment of prisoners of 
war is concerned. To shoot them would 
violate an affirmative rule of the law of 
armed conflict and the participants in 
such an episode would be guilty of 
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having committed a war crime. (A num-
ber of the individuals responsible for an 
incident of this nature at Malme'dy, 15 
including SS Colonel Joachim Peiper, 
were convicted of war crimes and sen-
tenced to death. 1 6 While they were not 
executed, they spent 13 years in jail-
and in July 1976, Peiper while living in 
the South of France was assassinated by 
revenge seekers. 1 7 The massacre of 
Poles in the Katyn Woods 1 8 may have 
been of the same nature. So also was 
Napoleon's massacre of more than 
3,500 Arabs in Jaffa in 1799.19 ) 
The law of armed conflict now spe-
cifically prohibits the taking of civilians 
as hostages. In another example, resis-
tance groups in the rear are destroying 
railroad tracks, blowing up trains, and 
ambushing truck routes, thus critically 
interfering with essential supply of 
troops in combat. The local commander 
orders the random taking of civilian 
hostages, some to be carried· in the 
trains and trucks being attacked, and 
others to be executed at the ratio of 10 
civilian hostages for each soldier of his 
command who is killed by the irregu-
lars. Is this order legal? No.- The rule 
prohibiting the taking of civilian 
hostages was drafted and adopted with 
full knowledge of the existence of the 
doctrine of military necessity and over-
rides it insofar as the use of hostages is 
concerned. To take hostages in the 
manner and for the purposes indicated 
would violate an affirmative rule of the 
law of armed conflict and the partici-
pants in such an episode would be guilty 
of having committed a war crime.2 0 
Reprisals. Reprisals are acts of re-
taliation, in the form of conduct which 
would otherwise be illegal, committed 
by one side in an armed conflict in 
order to put pressure on the other side 
to compel it to abandon a course of 
illegal action which it has been follow-
ing and to return to compliance with 
the law of armed conflict. 
It has sometimes been argued that 
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reprisals lead, not to redress of the 
wrong previously committed, but to 
new breaches. Nations have, in theory, 
admitted this to be a fact by agreeing to 
prohibit reprisals against various cate-
gories of protected persons and even 
against certain categories of property. 
Nevertheless, reprisals do still remain a 
possibility, however limited, under the 
law of armed conflict. Sometimes they 
are the only measure available to a 
• belligerent in its attempt to secure 
compliance with the law of armed con-
flict by its adversary. 
There are at least seven matters to be 
considered with respect to reprisals: 
1. The enemy must have committed 
an act which violates the law of armed 
conflict. (It could be argued that the act 
must also either be a continuing one or 
that the enemy has indicated that it will 
take the same action in the future when 
the occasion arises.) 
2. Reprisals must not be used until 
appropriate efforts to secure compliance 
with the particular law of armed con-
flict being violated by the enemy have 
been attempted and have been unsuc-
cessful. 
3. Reprisals should be used only 
upon the orders of a high military 
commander. Since the use of reprisals 
will rarely remain localized, the supreme 
commander or even the civilian govern-
ment, should normally be made aware 
of and approve the use of reprisals 
before they are actually undertaken. 
4. Reprisals may only be directed 
against enemy personnel who, and 
property which, are not within any 
provision excluding them as the targets 
of reprisals. For example, enemy hospi-
tals may not legally be the targets of 
reprisals as they are specifically pro-
tected against attack.21 Similarly, civil-
ian noncombatants22 and prisoners of 
war23 may not legally be the targets of 
reprisals as they are protected from 
reprisals by specific prohibitions con-
tained in the relevant 1949 Geneva 
Conventions. In effect, this really means 
that reprisals may only be directed 
against enemy combatants and against 
enemy property not protected by a 
specific rule of the law of armed con-
flict. 
5. Reprisals must be roughly propor-
tional to the enemy's original illegal act. 
Of course, it will frequently not be 
possible to give an exact quantitative 
value to the enemy's illegal act-but it 
will usually be possible to approximate 
that value within reasonable bounds . 
For example, when, during World War 
II, the Nazis adopted a reprisal policy of 
10 to 1, and even 100 to 1, there could 
be no question but that they were 
violating the rule of proportionality.24 
Similarly, the action taken at Lidice was 
a reprisal which outrageously violated 
the rule of proportionality. 25 But when 
the enemy intentionally bombs a hospi-
tal there can only be a commonsense 
gauge of proportionality. 
6. Reprisals need not necessarily be 
of the same nature as the original illegal 
act. For example, the reprisal response 
to maltreatment of prisoners of war by 
the enemy need not, in fact it may not, 
be maltreatment of prisoners 9f war by 
the other side. 
7. While relatively little has been 
written on the subject, it appears that 
the very nature and purpose of reprisals 
require that they be directed against the 
state whose personnel committed the 
alleged violation of the law of armed 
conflict and not against an ally of that 
state.26 
Here are some specific cases of re-
prisals which have occurred in the past. 
During the American Civil War there 
was no rule of the law of war protecting 
prisoners of war against being the tar-
gets of reprisals. A Union commander 
(Custer) executed six members of a 
Confederate irregular cavalry unit on 
the basis that they were bandits, not 
soldiers. The Confederate commander 
(Mosby) executed five Union prisoners 
of war as a reprisal. That ended the 
episode, the irregulars captured there-
after were treated as prisoners of war. 2 7 
Reprisals worked in this instance. 
During World War II, in 1942 at 
Dieppe and at Sark, Canadian and 
British commandos tied the hands of 
their German prisoners of war together 
in order to prevent them from destroy-
ing documents having intelligence value. 
The Germans captured a copy of the 
order containing instructions in this 
regard and promptly responded by 
handcuffing 1,000 British and Canadian 
inmates of prisoner-of-war camps for 12 
hours a day. The British, apparently 
contending that their action had not 
been a violation of the law of armed 
conflict but that the German action 
was, responded by handcuffing a large 
number of German prisoners of war. 
Although the British abandoned the use 
of shackles after a few months, the 
Germans continued the practice for 
another year.28 Both alleged reprisals 
were, of course, violations of the pro-
hibition on reprisals against prisoners of 
war. 
During 1965 a member of the Viet-
cong was tried and convicted of acts of 
terrorism by a court of the Republic of 
Vietnam and he was executed. Three 
days later the Vietcong announced the 
reprisal execution of an American 
prisoner of war. Shortly thereafter three 
members of the Vietcong were tried and 
convicted for acts of terrorism by an-
other court of the Republic .of Vietnam 
and were executed. A few days later the 
Vietcong announced the reprisal execu-
tion of two American prisoners of 
war.29 Apart from the fact that these 
alleged reprisals by the Vietcong vio-
lated the specific prohibition .against 
making prisoners of war the targets of 
reprisals (the Vietcong claimed not to 
be bound by the humanitarian conven-
tions), it should be noted that it was the 
Republic of Vietnam, not the United 
States, which had committed the acts 
against which the reprisals were di-
rected. The Vietcong were, in effect, 
executing American prisoners of war in 
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order to apply pressure on the Republic 
of Vietnam. In this case the indirect 
pressure apparently accomplished its 
purpose as Vietcong te.rrorists subse-
quently convicted and sentenced to 
death were not executed. 
Protection of Civilian Noncombat-
ants. During the early years of recorded 
history, such as that contained in the 
Bible, no distinction was made between 
combatants and noncombatants, and all 
were usually put to the sword or en-
slaved. But by the late Middle Ages, 
before the days of professional armies 
and rampant nationalism, apart from 
the sieges of cities, war could more or 
less pass the civilian noncombatant by, 
leaving him physically untouched. 
Changes in this respect began to appear 
in the 17th century and a rather radical 
transformation had occurred by the 
beginning of the 19th century, particu-
larly during the Napoleonic wars. While 
the 1899 and 1907 Hague Regula-
tions30 included some combat restraints 
on actions directed against civilian non-
combatants, such as a prohibition 
against the bombardment of un-
. defended cities, a prohibition against 
the use of coercion to obtain military 
information, and the granting of a pro-
tected status to members of the levee en 
masse, there were really few rules pro-
tecting civilian noncombatants from 
being intentionally made the targets of 
combat actions. Even the 1949 Geneva 
Civilians Convention,31 revolutionary in 
concept as it was, contains surprisingly 
few provisions that can be considered as 
protecting the civilian noncombatant 
from combat actions. It is true that this 
Convention prohibits belligerents from 
using civilians to render an area immune 
from attack; prohibits the use of civil-
ians as the objects of reprisals; and 
prohibits the use of civilians as hostages. 
But when one has completed that short 
list one has just about covered all of the 
protection of civilians against combat 
actions contained in the 159 articles 
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of the 1949 Geneva Civilians Conven-
tion. 
Efforts are currently being made to 
remedy this situation. The Diplomatic 
Conference on the Reaffirmation and 
Develop~ent of International Humani-
tarian Law Applicable in Armed Con-
flicts, which has already convened on 
three separate occasions and which is 
expected to complete its work during 
1977, has tentatively adopted a number 
of articles for the protection of civilians 
from combat activities, most of which 
can be expected to be a part of the 
Protocol finally approved. One such 
article (Article 46, adopted in commit-
tee by consensus)32 provides that '.'civil-
ians shall enjoy general protection 
against dangers arising from military 
operations." It then goes on to enumer-
ate a number of specific protections: 
• Prohibition against making civil-
ians the objects of an attack. 
• Prohibition against acts or threats 
of violence intended to spread terror 
among the civilian population. 
• Prohibition against indiscriminate 
attacks. These attacks are defined as 
those which have no specific military 
objective; or those which employ a 
method or means of attack which can-
not be directed at a specific military 
objective, or the effect of which cannot 
be limited to that objective. Examples 
of indiscriminate attacks are area 
bombardments where the area so bom-
barded contains a concentration of 
civilians; and attacks which would cause 
loss of civilian lives in a number which 
would be excessive in the light of the 
"concrete and direct military advantage 
anticipated. " 
• Prohibition against attacks against 
civilians by way of reprisals. 
• Prohibition against the use of 
civilians to render a location immune 
from military operations, including the 
movement of civilians to shield military 
objectives or military operations. 
A number of other articles of the 
Protocol which have been tentatively 
approved would also afford. protection 
to civilians against combat activities. 
Thus, Article 48 (adopted in committee 
by consensus)33 forbids military attacks 
on "objects indispensable to the survival 
of the civilian population," such as 
foodstuffs, food-producing areas, crops, 
livestock, drinking water, etc. This pro-
hibition is applicable whether the 
motive for the attack is "to starve out 
civilians, to cause them to move away, 
or any other motive." Again, Article 50 
(adopted in committee by a vote of 
66-0-3)34 and Article 51 (adopted in 
committee by consensus)35 require the 
commander of an attacking. force to 
take certain precautions intended to 
protect the local civilian population 
before the attack is actually launched. 
These articles of the Protocol to the 
1949 Geneva Conventions which is in 
process of preparation are but a few 
examples of what the Diplomatic Con-
ference hopes to accomplish towards 
the goal of better protecting civilian 
noncombatants from the effects of com-
bat actions. Unfortunately, when one 
has. had .the opportunity to read and 
analyze them, one cannot avoid the 
feeling that a number of them are so 
impractical that it will be extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, for even the 
most law-abiding commander to comply 
with them fully. This is regrettable as it 
means that there will be a limited 
number of ratifications and many 
valuable and acceptable provisions will 
be lost; or there will be ratifications but 
no compliance. 
Prisoners of War. The 1949 Geneva 
Prisoner of War Convention36 is 
probably the most complete single code 
contained in the law of armed conflict. 
Since its drafting and acceptance by the 
vast majority of the nations which 
constitute the present-day world com-
munity, there has been available for the 
guidance of nations at war a substantial 
and pervasive body of law on this 
subject. 
We are here concerned, of course, 
only with those aspects of this Conven-
tion which relate to the protection of 
prisoners of war by restraints on com-
bat. Understandably, there are only a 
few provisions of the Prisoner of War 
Convention which may be deemed. to 
fall within this category. Thus, prisoners 
of war are to be evacuated from the 
combat zone as soon as possible after 
capture and are not to be unnecessarily 
exposed to danger while awaiting such 
evacuation (Article 19); the evacuation 
is to be accomplished in as humane·a 
manner as possible (Article 20); the 
capturing troops are prohibited from 
taking anything from the prisoners of 
war except arms, military equipment, 
and military documents (Article 18); 
prisoners of war may not be sent to, or 
detained in, areas where they will be 
exposed to the dangers of the combat 
zone, nor may they be used to render an 
area immune from attack (Article 23); 
and prisoner-of-war camps are to be 
marked so that they can be identified 
by an attacking force (Article 23). Of 
course, as has already been noted in the 
discussion of military necessity, the 
protection against maltreatment con-
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tained in the Convention includes a 
positive ban on shooting them even 
though the combat force which captures 
them does not have the facilities for 
their evacuation.3 7 In fact, the willful 
killing of prisoners of war is a grave 
breach of the Convention and calls for 
penal sanctions against the offenders.3 8 
They cannot avoid this responsibility by 
refusing quarter and thus contending 
that the individuals killed were never 
prisoners of war, since Article 23( d) of 
the 1907 Hague Regulations39 specifi-
cally bans any declaration that no 
quarter will be given. 
The foregoing is a rather summary 
treatment of four very important areas 
of the law of armed conflict dealing 
with combat restraints. However, it 
should demonstrate beyond dispute 
that, paradoxical as it may seem, 
civilization has evolved many humani-
tarian rules calling for such conflict to 
be conducted in a manner calculated to 
reduce unnecessary suffering and to 
provide a maximum of protection for 
the victims thereof, combatant and non-
combatant. The problem in this area, as 
in many other areas, is not lack of law, 
it is lack of compliance with the law. 
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